Teleology versus Immanence

Adaptation is a principle particular to live. It gives a material form and its tools the propriety of appropriateness, which is connected to its ability to reproduce. As principle, adaptation is invariant and exists outside the objects on which it applies. Appropriateness is an attribute of an object and its formation and persistence depends on the environment. In the evolutionary theory, the teleological fallacy is conceiving appropriateness as a principle and gives it therefore undue force of expression. The sentence, "The peacock attracts the hen with his feathers and spreads his genes this way." is the observation of a fact which is probably based on adaptation and the theory of evolution may therefore explain how it works. In an evolutionary context, the 'to' in "The peacock has his feathers to attract the hen and spread his genes" would in addition asserts adaptation as an explanation, but as it is nearly self evident, the 'to' gives rooms to misinterpretation. For instance it suggests that the feathers are of use for the peacock and forgotten, that they are also useful for the hen, namely to choose the best peacock for her. It suggests also, that the ability to have this feathers is bound to the peacock, and oversee that ultimately the feathers are determined by the choice of the hen. "With his wool, the sheep survives the winter." connects the wool with the winter. "The sheep has wool to survive the winter" suggests a will in the sheep, although adaptation, in its elements spontaneous DNA change, reproduction and selection, does not need anything else than natural laws and an appropriate environment, inclusively the sheep at the beginning of his evolution. By "the will of life" as "the will to live", in analogy to the sheep and the winter, the will would be created by an other will, even if of an other kind.

The reason recognizes laws and proprieties, and the will is the feeling and overcoming of the resisting instincts to carry out what the reason tells the most appropriate. The will belongs to the psychological phenomenon, which alone justifies and motivates the life; by sensations, as Kant showed in the "Prolegomena", so that moral, beauty and the logic itself are experienced by sensory impression. The appropriateness must reckon the maintaining of the motivation, inclusively will and reason; taking into account, that appropriateness gets in wight by steadiness, while the will, and the reason alike, is determined by the temporary, because otherwise it would be an habit and develop into an instinct. In societies arise ideologies, or trues, which purpose are to foster the group's cohesion and to focus the action, while they often go at odd with the knowledge. Partly induced and justified by evolutionary teleology, an ideology of survival by the will, also ideal will, and its counterpart, the overcoming of the natural reality by the reason, also ideal reason, have been established. The destructive and inside the group decomposing consequences of the ideal will provide the ideal reason the lack of alternatives that justify the risk of its project. The improbability of its project's success is justified by the reason itself, for instance with the refutation of Kant's Categorical Imperative or by the Prisoner Dilemma, but it gives the blame for a lack of solution on the rejection of the moral, which is needed for the groups cohesion, by the ideal will, the more at it stands in contrast to its idealized society. Finally, the ideal reason renounces on the possibility of life at all, or at least on its moral justification, and can no longer imagine the men' terms outside its dogmatic. The failure of the ideal will is the ideal reason's alibi, while the ideal will remains in its error, because the ideal reason provides no purpose. The one fails because it negates reality, and the other because it misinterpreted it.